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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000008

SIPDIS

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SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 01/02/2005

REF: A. 04 MUSCAT 2291

[B](#). 04 RIYADH 6557

[C](#). 04 MUSCAT 2246

Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III.

Reason: 1.4(c)(g).

Summary

[1](#). (SBU) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the core Emergency Action Committee January 2 to review the Embassy's security posture following to the local holiday weekend. Members of the EAC noted no substantive changes in the local security environment since the last meeting. Accordingly, the EAC agreed that the Embassy's already heightened security posture and FPCON remain appropriate. End Summary.

Security Environment

[1](#)2. (SBU) On January 2, the Ambassador chaired a meeting of the core Emergency Action Committee ("EAC") to review the Embassy's security posture following the local holiday weekend. The meeting opened with a discussion of the local and regional security situations; the EAC continued to characterize the former as stable. Likewise, the EAC noted no new threat reporting specific to Oman. Members cited no security incidents among their staffs or family members over the weekend, and CONS confirmed that there were no security incidents or security-related queries from the private American citizen community.

Jeddah Lessons Learned

[1](#)3. (SBU) In furtherance of the EAC's previous discussions on lessons learned from the December 6 terrorist attack on U.S. Consulate General Jeddah, RSO distributed copies of, and led a detailed discussion on, refTel B. In addition to actions already taken in response to previous reporting of the attack (refTel C), the EAC will use Jeddah's lessons learned as part of their ongoing review of avenues to enhance and sustain the Embassy's security posture.

Continued Vigilance

[1](#)4. (SBU) RSO reiterated that members of the EAC must continue reinforcing to both their staffs and family members the need for vigilance regarding all aspects of personal security, including the need to maintain a low profile and to remain unpredictable. Likewise, RSO re-emphasized the importance of immediately reporting suspicious activity or security-related incidents -- especially those involving suspected surveillance -- to Post One.

Physical Security

[1](#)5. (C) Prior to concluding the meeting, RSO advised that the trench barrier systems which run along the sides of the Chancery compound, where stand-off is reduced by vacant diplomatic lots, were re-dug over the weekend. Jersey barriers were also repositioned to limit unauthorized access to the Chancery compound's employee parking lot and vehicle entrance.

EAC Conclusion

[1](#)6. (S/NF) The EAC concluded that there have been no substantive changes in previously reported assessments of the local security environment since the last meeting held on

December 29 (reftel A), and that the Embassy's FPCON and already heightened security posture remain appropriate. Nonetheless, the EAC remains acutely aware of the need to monitor both the regional and local security and threat environments, and is prepared to take the necessary countermeasures should changes to either occur. AMB, A/DCM, RSO, A/MGT, RMAS, P/E, CONS, MSG, DAO, OMC (USDR), and ECA (USCENTAF) participated in the meeting, which was preceded by a meeting of the Visas Viper Committee.

BALTIMORE